Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized News
  Aggregation by Li, Anqi et al.
Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized News
Aggregation
Anqi Li∗ Lin Hu† Ilya Segal‡
Abstract
We study a model of electoral accountability and selection (EAS) in which vot-
ers with heterogeneous horizontal preferences pay limited attention to the incumbent’s
performance using personalized news aggregators. Extreme voters’ news aggregators
exhibit an own-party bias, which hampers their abilities to discern good and bad per-
formances. While this effect alone would undermine EAS, there is a countervailing ef-
fect stemming from the disagreement between extreme voters, which makes the centrist
voter pivotal and could potentially improve EAS. Thus increasing mass polarization and
shrinking attention spans have ambiguous effects on EAS, whereas nuanced regulations
of news aggregators unambiguously improve EAS and voter welfare.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the idea that tech-enabled news personalization could have significant political
consequences has been put forward in the academia and popular press (Sunstein (2009);
Pariser (2011); Gentzkow (2016); Obama (2017); Prior (2017)). This paper studies how
personalized news aggregation for rational inattentive voters (hereafter PNARI) affects the
society’s abilities to motivate and retain talented politicians through elections.
Our premise is that rational demand for news aggregation in the digital era is driven by
limited attention capacities. As more people get news online where the amount of available
information (2.5 quintillion bytes) is vastly greater than what any individual can process in
a lifetime, consumers must turn to news aggregators for content aggregation, personalized
based on individuals’ characteristics, preferences, and needs.1 In this paper, we study what
kind of personalized news is aggregated for and consumed by voters with limited attention
capacities, and how this in turn affects electoral accountability and selection (hereafter
EAS).
Our analysis is carried out in a standard model of policymaking and election with two
periods. In period one, a candidate (named R) assumes office and privately observes his
ability, which is either high or low. A high-ability incumbent can exert high effort at a cost
or low effort at no cost, whereas a low-ability incumbent can only exert low effort. Effort
generates performance data, based on which voters decide whether to retain the incumbent
or to replace him with a challenger (named L) in an election. Voting is expressive and
forward-looking, i.e., each voter votes for the candidate who generates the highest expected
future payoff to him, and the election outcome is determined by simple majority rule. In
period two, voters’ payoffs are increasing in the elected officer’s ability.
To creat a role for PNARI, we depart from the representative voter paradigm and work
1News aggregators (e.g., aggregator sites, feed reader apps) operate by sifting through myriad online
sources and directing readers to the stories they might find interesting. They have recently gained prominence
as more people get news online, from social media and through mobile devices (Matsa and Lu (2016)).
The top three popular news websites in 2019: Yahoo! News, Google News and Huffington Post, are all
aggregators. See Athey and Mobius (2012), Athey Mobius, and Pal (2017) and Chiou and Tucker (2017) for
standard background readings and literature surveys.
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instead with multiple voters with heterogeneous horizontal preferences. A voter’s relative
valuation of candidate R over L in period two equals his horizontal preference, plus R’s
ability. Prior to election, voters can build personalized news aggregators, modeled as signal
structures that aggregate performance data into news signals. Consuming the content
carried by news signals improves expressive voting decisions while incurring an attention
cost that is posterior separable (Caplin and Dean (2013); Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2019)).
Voters have limited bandwidths, but are otherwise free to specify any signal structure, due
to the flexibility in building RSS feed readers themselves or the freedom to choose between
multiple platforms that compete for customers’ attention and eyeballs.2 A personalized
news aggregator for a voter maximizes his expressive voting utility, subject to his bandwidth
constraint.
Personalized news exhausts voters’ bandwidths with binary recommendations as to
which candidate to vote for. Indeed, any information beyond voting recommendations
would only raise the attention cost without any corresponding benefit and hence is waste-
ful. Moreover, voting recommendations are strictly obeyed by voters, because if a voter has
a (weakly) preferred candidate that is independent of the voting recommendations, then he
could obtain the same expressive voting utility without paying attention, let alone exhaust
his bandwidth, a contradiction.
To examine how voters’ horizontal preferences affect personzlied news, we consider a
symmetric environment featuring a left-wing voter, a centrist voter, and a right-wing voter.
While the personalized news for centrist voter is unbiased, that of extreme voters exhibits
an own-party bias, i.e., recommend the voter’s own-party candidate more often than his
opposite-party candidate. This is because extreme voters would always vote for their own-
party candidates without paying attention, and so derive utilities from being convinced to
vote across party lines. The corresponding voting recommendation must be very strong
and, constrained by bandwidths, must also be very rare (hereafter occasional big surprise).
Most of the time, the recommendation is to vote along party lines, which together with
2Section 2.1 details the business model of news aggregators.
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the occasional big surprise has been documented in the empirical literature (Fiorina and
Abrams (2008); Gentzkow (2016); DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010); Flaxman, Goel, and
Rao (2016)).
To illustrate the effect of PNARI on EAS, suppose voters’ population distribution is
uniform, which together with occasional big surprise implies that each voter is pivotal with
a positive probability. Consider two events. In the first event, extreme voters agree on
which candidate to vote for, so the incentive power generated by their news aggregators
(i.e., the ability to discern good and bad performances) determines the society’s ability to
uphold EAS. In the second event, extreme voters receive conflicting recommendations, so the
centrist voter is pivotal and contributes to EAS through the incentive power generated by
his news aggregator. Taken together, extreme voters’ news aggregators affect EAS through
the incentive power and disagreement they generate. Such a disagreement, together with
the own-party bias, has been on the rise in recent years (Gentzkow (2016); Carroll, Kiley,
and Asheer (2019)).
We examine several comparative statics results. First, we find that increases in ex-
treme voters’ horizontal preferences make their news signals more biased and so reduce
the incentive power they generate. While this effect alone would undermine EAS, there
is a countervailing effect stemming from the disagreement between extreme voters, which
occurs more frequently as extreme voters become more partisan. The combined effect on
EAS is in general ambiguous. Likewise, while increased bandwidth enhances the incentive
power generated by individual voters’ news aggregators, they could also increase the dis-
agreement between extreme voters and, in turn, undermine EAS. Together, these results
paint a nuanced picture where factors that usually carry a negative connotation in everyday
political discourse, such as increasing mass polarization (Fiorina and Abrams (2008)) and
shrinking attention spans (Dunaway (2016); Teixeira (2014); Prior (2017)), could prove con-
ducive to EAS, whereas well-intentioned attempts to battle the rising polarization through
providing voters with neutral viewpoints (e.g., Allsides.com) could undermine EAS. Inter-
estingly, correlating voters’ news signals, if done appropriately, could unambiguously uphold
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accountability, optimize selection, maximize expressive voting utilities and, together, attain
the maximal voter welfare.
1.1 Related literature
Rational inattention The growing literature on rational inattention (hereafter RI) has
recently been surveyed by Caplin (2016) and Mac´kowiak, Mateˇjka, and Wiederholt (2018).
The current analysis is carried out in a standard setting where the decision-maker can ag-
gregate source data into any signal through paying a posterior-separable attention cost.
Posterior separability has recently received attention from economists because of its ax-
iomatic and revealed-preference foundations (Caplin and Dean (2015); Zhong (2017); Denti
(2018); Tsakas (2019)), connections to sequential learning (He´bert and Woodford (2017);
Morris and Strack (2017)), and validations by lab experiments (Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and
Stewart (2019); Dean and Nelighz (2019)).
Recent applications of RI to political economy include Mateˇjka and Tabellini (2016) and
Hu, Li, and Segal (2019). The flexibility of RI attention allocation, which drives our main
predictions, also plays a significant role in these studies of electoral competition games.
Flexibility is absent from models of rational ignorance, a termed coined by Downs (1957)
and recently used by political scientists such as Prato and Wolton (2016) to refer to rigid
information acquisition, e.g., drawing a signal from a given distribution. Existing studies
of electoral accountability with a rationally ignorant voter (e.g., Trombetta (2020)) differ
completely from ours.
Media bias The literature on media bias is thoroughly surveyed by Prat and Stro¨mberg
(2013), Stro¨mberg (2015), and Anderson, Stro¨mberg, and J. Waldfogel (2016). In the
literature on demand-driven media bias, the idea that even rational consumers can exhibit
a preference for biased news when constrained by information processing capacities dates
back to Calvert (1985) and is later expanded on by Suen (2004), Burke (2008), and Che
and Mierendorff (2019). However, these authors consider non-RI information aggregation
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technologies and do not examine the consequence of news bias for EAS. Even if they did,
their results could still differ from ours.3 In Hu, Li, and Segal (2019), news is aggregated
by a monopolistic infomediary who maximizes voters’ attention. Here, voters can aggregate
news optimally as in the standard RI paradigm.
In political science, the term own-party bias, or party-sorting, refers to the positive
correlation between a person’s party affiliation and his propensity to support his own-party
candidate. The past decade has witnessed a rise in the own-party bias without significant
changes in voters’ policy preferences (Fiorina and Abrams (2008); Gentzkow (2016)), a
trend that could persist due to PNARI. This prediction is supported by Flaxman, Goel,
and Rao (2016), who find that using news aggregators increases one’s own-party bias, as
well as his opinion intensity when supporting his opposite-party candidate (i.e., occasional
big surprise). Occasional big surprise is a hallmark of Bayesian rationality, and its evidence
is surveyed by DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). In contrast, the non-Bayesian model of
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) predicts an confirmatory bias but not any occasional big
surprise.
Electoral accountability The literature on electoral accountability is surveyed by Ash-
worth (2012), Healy and Malhotra (2013), and Duggan and Martinelli (2017). By studying
how PNARI affects the opinion distribution across heterogeneous voters, we enrich the ex-
isting insights into how voters’ partisanship, information, and exposures to biased media
could affect electoral accountability, most of which are derived from studying a single voter
(see, among others, Ashworth and de Mesquita (2006); Prat (2005), Ashworth and Shotts
(2010), Fox and Van Weelden (2012), Ashworth and de Mesquita (2014), Ashworth, de
Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2016); Warren (2012), Adachi and Hizen (2014), Gehlbach and
3E.g., the information aggregation technology in Suen (2004) partitions realizations of a continuous state
variable into two cells. The resulting signal realizations are monotone in voters’ horizontal preferences (i.e.,
if a left-wing voter is recommended to vote for candidate R, then a right-wing voter must receive the same
voting recommendation), so median voter’s signal determines the election outcome despite a plurality of
voters and media.
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Sonin (2014), Wolton (2019))).4 A notable exception is Egorov (2009), who studies a pure
moral hazard model in which different voters care about different aspects of the incum-
bent’s effort. The prediction that performance transparency has a non-monotonic effect on
accountability, while similar to ours on the surface, stems from the multi-tasking nature of
the problem rather than voters’ disagreement about the incumbent’s ability.
Common agency Since Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the theory of common agency
has been successfully applied to the studies of various political economy issues (see Mallard
(2014) for a survey). Peters (2001) gives a general formulation of common agency games with
moral hazard where principals can assign general allocations, not just monetary transfers to
an agent. We study a special case of this general formulation where an allocation is a profile
of news aggregators. Khalil, Martimort, and Parigic (2007) and Gailmard (2009) also study
common agency games with endogenous monitoring decisions, though their principals are
homogeneous and monitoring technologies rigid.
2 Model
There are two candidates L and R and three voters k ∈ K = {−1, 0, 1} of a unit mass. Voter
k’s population equals fk ∈ (0, 1), and his horizontal preference between the two candidates
is captured by a real number vk ∈ (−1, 1). The game begins with candidate R assuming
office and privately observing his ability θ, which is either high or low and has zero mean.
A high-ability incumbent can exert high effort a = 1 at a cost c > 0 or low effort a = 0 at
no cost, whereas a low-ability incumbent can only exert low effort. The incumbent’s effort
choice a ∈ {0, 1}, which is his private information, generates performance data, modeled
as a binary random variable with full support Ω = {−1, 1} and p.m.f. pa. After that, an
election takes place, in which voters decide whether to re-elect R or to replace him with L.
Compared to the second outcome, the first outcome generates a future payoff vk+θ to voter
4Also the above studies focus on supply-driven biases stemming from media’s desires to persuade voters,
whereas we study demand-driven news bias.
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k that equals his horizontal preference parameter plus R’s ability. Voting is expressive and
forward-looking, meaning that each voter votes for the candidate that generates the highest
expected future payoff to him. The election outcome is determined by simple majority rule
with ties broken in favor of the incumbent, and the winning candidate earns an ego rent of
one.
Prior to election, voters can build and use personalized news aggregators, which aggregate
performance data into news content that is easy to process and useful for individual decision-
making. A news aggregator for voter k is a finite signal structure Πk : Ω → ∆ (Z), where
each Πk (· | ω) specifies a probability distribution over a finite set Z of signal realizations
conditional on R’s performance state being ω ∈ Ω. Absorbing the content delivered by
Πk requires an amount I (Πk) of attention, which mustn’t exceed the voter’s bandwidth
Ik ∈ (0, 1). After that, the voter observes the signal realization, updates his belief about
R’s ability, and casts his vote.
The game sequence is as follows.
1. Candidate R observes his ability, makes an effort choice, and generates performance
data.
2. Voters build personalized news aggregators without observing moves in Stage 1.
3. Voters pay attention, observe the signal realizations generated by their news aggrega-
tors, and cast votes.
We consider a symmetric environment in which −v = v−1 < v0 = 0 < v1 = v, f−1 = f1,
and I−1 = I1. Voters −1, 0, 1 are called left-wing, centrist, and right-wing, respectively, and
for now the signals generated by their news aggregators are assumed to be conditionally
independent for any given ω ∈ Ω. Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We say that an equilibrium sustains accountability if the high-ability incumbent exerts high
effort, and that accountability is sustainable if it can be sustained in an equilibrium. Our
main goal is to understand when accountability is sustainable, and through what means.
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2.1 Model discussion
Performance data We model the incumbent’s performance data (e.g., economic indica-
tors) as a binary random variable (see Appendix B for an extension to continuous random
variable). Since voters care only about the incumbent’s ability when making voting deci-
sions, it is w.l.o.g. to identify each performance state ω ∈ Ω with the conditional expected
ability E [θ | ω, aH = 1] of the incumbent in that state, where aH = 1 indicates that the
expectation is taken under the assumption that the high-ability incumbent exerts high ef-
fort. A consequence of this normalization is p0(1)p0(−1) <
p1(1)
p1(−1) , i.e., high effort is more likely
to generate good performance ω = 1 rather than bad performance ω = −1 compared to
low effort. Setting Ω to {−1, 1} has two consequences. First, in the case where aH = 1,
each ω ∈ Ω must be realized with .5 probability in order to satisfy E [θ] = 0. Second, since
v ∈ (0, 1), even extreme voters would vote for candidate R (resp. L) if ω = 1 (resp. ω = −1)
had ω been perfectly observable, so horizontal preference itself doesn’t create biased voting
decisions.5
News aggregation A news aggregator aggregates source data into content, which in turn
shapes voter’s belief about the incumbent’s ability. The distribution of beliefs is determined
by a finite signal structure Π : Ω → ∆ (Z), which, in the case of aH = 1, outputs signal
realization z ∈ Z with probability
piz =
∑
ω∈Ω
Π (z | ω) · 1
2
.
Assume w.l.o.g. that piz > 0 for all z ∈ Z (equivalently, Π(z | ω) > 0 for some ω ∈ Ω).
Then
µz =
∑
ω∈Ω
ω ·Π (z | ω) / (2piz)
5If v > 1, then extreme voters would always vote along party lines, so only the centrist voter matters for
our analysis.
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is the posterior mean of the incumbent’s performance conditional on the signal realization
being z, and it fully captures one’s posterior belief about the incumbent’s ability after
absorbing the content delivered the news aggregator.
Attention We model attention as a scarce resource that reduces voter’s uncertainty about
the incumbent’s performance:
Assumption 1. In the case where the high-ability incumbent exerts high effort, absorbing
the content delivered by a news aggregator Π : Ω→ ∆ (Z) requires the following amount of
attention:
I (Π) =
∑
z∈Z
piz · h (µz) , (1)
where the function h : [−1, 1]→ R+ is continuous on [−1, 1], twice differentiable on (−1, 1),
and satisfies the following properties: (i) h is strictly convex on [−1, 1] and h (0) = 0; (ii)
h is symmetric around zero; and (iii) h (1) = 1.
Equation (1) coupled with Assumption 1(i) is equivalent to weak posterior separability, a
notion proposed by Caplin and Dean (2013) to generalize Shannon entropy as a measure of
attention cost.6 In the current context, weak posterior separability stipulates that absorbing
the null signal requires no attention, and more attention is needed for moving one’s posterior
belief closer to the true state and as news becomes more Blackwell informative.
Assumption 1(ii) and (iii) impose regularities on our problem. Assumption 1(ii) is
stronger than what’s needed for proving most of our results, stipulating that only the
magnitude of the posterior mean could affect the attention cost, whereas its sign (which
indicates the direction of belief updating) couldn’t. Assumption 1(iii) normalizes the needed
6Various foundations for posterior separability have been proposed since Shannon (1948), who examines
a situation in which a voter can ask a series of yes-or-no questions about the performance state at a constant
marginal cost. The more questions the voter asks, the more precise his posterior belief is about the perfor-
mance state. According to Shannon (1948), the minimal average number of questions that needs to be asked
in order to implement a signal structure equals approximately the mutual information between the source
data and output signal. More recently, He´bert and Woodford (2017) and Morris and Strack (2017) study
optimal stopping problems where a decision maker consults one of the many sources sequentially and incurs
a (time and belief-dependent) flow cost until the process is randomly terminated. These authors provide
general conditions under which the expected total cost is posterior separable in the continuous-time limit.
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attention for absorbing performance data without error to one unit, which together with
Ik < 1 ∀k ∈ K implies that voters must garble performance data in order to stay within
their bandwidths.
Assumption 1 is satisfied by many commonly used attention functions. While the up-
coming analysis won’t make functional form assumptions about h, it is still useful to keep in
mind two special cases h (µ) = µ2 and h (µ) = H ((1 + µ) /2) (H denotes the binary entropy
function), in which I (Π) equals the reductions in the variance and Shannon entropy of the
incumbent’s performance, respectively, before and after one uses Π.
PNARI We share the same view as Prat and Stro¨mberg (2013) that instrumental voting
is an important motive for consuming political news.7 Our voters can choose among all
feasible news aggregators that do not exhaust their bandwidths, due to the flexibility in
building RSS feed readers themselves or the freedom to choose between multiple platforms
that compete for customers’ attention and eyeballs.8 A personalized news aggregator for a
voter maximizes his expressive voting utility, subject to his feasibility constraint.
3 Analysis
Throughout this section, we ignore the equilibrium in which accountability breaks down
and voters pay no attention to the incumbent’s performance (which always exists), and
focus instead on the possibility of sustaining accountability in an equilibrium. To establish
a benchmark, suppose Ik ≥ 1 for all k ∈ K. In that case, all voters can fully absorb
performance data without error and so will vote for the incumbent if and only if ω = 1. Thus,
accountability is sustainable if and only if 1 ≥ cˆ, where 1 is the difference in the probabilities
7Stro¨mberg (2004), Chan and Suen (2008), Mateˇjka and Tabellini (2016), and Perego and Yuksel (2018)
study political models in which voters acquire information to improve expressive voting.
8A major revenue source for modern news aggregators is displaying advertising. Ad revenue is increasing
in the attention paid by customers, because the more informational content a customer absorbs, the longer
he stays on the platform and so is exposed to more ads. Click here for the tactics deployed by Facebook,
e.g., playing mid-roll ads when users are already in the “lean-back” reading/watching model.
11
that the incumbent wins re-election given good and bad performances, respectively, and
cˆ =
c
p1 (1)− p0 (1) (2)
is the threshold that needs to be cross in order to sustain accountability in an equilibrium.
To make our analysis interesting, we shall henceforth assume that cˆ ≤ 1 and Ik < 1
∀k ∈ K. In Section 3.1, we assume there’s accountability and solve for personalized news
aggregators. In Section 3.2, we take personalized news aggregators as given and verify
whether accountability is sustainable or not. In Section 3.3, we touch on the issue of
selection.
3.1 Personalized news aggregator
Since extreme voters would always vote along party lines without paying attention, paying
attention improves their expressive voting decisions only if it sometimes changes their minds
and leads them to vote across party lines. After paying attention, voter k strictly prefers
candidate R to L if vk +µz > 0, and he strictly prefers candidate L to R if vk +µz < 0. Ex
ante, voter k’s expected utility gain from using a news aggregator Π is
Vk (Π) =
∑
z∈Z
piz · νk (µz) (3)
where
νk (µz) =

[vk + µz]
+ if k ≤ 0,
− [vk + µz]− if k > 0.
Thus, a personalized news aggregator for voter k solves
max
Z,Π:Ω→∆(Z)
Vk (Π) s.t. I (Π) ≤ Ik. (4)
The lemma gives preliminary characterizations for personalized new aggregators (see
Section 1 for discussion of intuition).
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Lemma 1. The personalized news aggregator Πk for any voter k ∈ K is unique, exhausts his
bandwidth, and prescribes binary voting recommendations he strictly obeys, i.e., I (Πk) = Ik,
Zk = {L,R}, and vk + µL,k < 0 < vk + µR,k.
Henceforth, we shall focus on binary signal structures, which by Bayes’ rule must satisfy
µL < 0 < µR. Since the performance state is binary, it is w.l.o.g. to identify any binary
signal structure with the corresponding profile (|µL|, µR). Since Bayes’ plausibility mandates
that the expected posterior mean must equal the prior mean, i.e.,
∑
z∈{L,R} piz · µz = 0, it
follows that
piL =
|µR|
|µL|+ µR and piR =
|µL|
|µL|+ µR . (5)
Thus, a typical level curve of the attention function is
{
(|µL|, µR) : µR|µL|+ µRh(|µL|) +
|µL|
|µL|+ µRh(µR) = I
}
,
and it is downward sloping by Assumption 1. Among all signal structures on this level curve,(
h−1 (I) , h−1 (I)
)
is neutral, as it recommends both candidates with equal probability. Any
other signal structure is either L-biased, i.e., recommends candidate L more often than R,
or R-biased, i.e., recommends candidate R more often than L. Indeed, we can define the
bias B of a signal structure as |µL|/µR, where B < 1 means the signal structure is L-biased,
B = 1 means it is neutral, and B > 1 means it is R-biased. For any two signal structures
Π and Π′ on the same level curve, Π is more L-biased than Π′ if B < B′, and Π is more
R-biased than Π′ if B > B′.
The next lemma characterizes the biases of personalized news aggregators (see Section
1 for discussion of intuition).
Lemma 2. The centrist voter’s news aggregator Π0 is neutral. Extreme voters’ news ag-
gregators exhibit own-party biases, i.e., Π−1 and Π1 are L-biased and R-biased, respectively,
and they become more so as v increases.
To see how the own-party bias exhibited by extreme voters’ news aggregators affects
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aggregate outcomes, we define the incentive power Pk generated by voter k’s news aggregator
as its ability in discerning good and bad performances, formally captured by the difference
in its probabilities of recommending the incumbent for re-election given good and bad
performances, respectively:
Pk =
2|µL,k|µR,k
|µL,k|+ µR,k .
We also define D as the probability that extreme voters receive conflicting voting recom-
mendations and so disagree about which candidate to vote for:
D = 1− 2|µL,1|µR,1 (1 + |µL,1|µR,1)
(|µL,1|+ µR,1)2
.
The next lemma examines the comparative statics of Pks and D.
Lemma 3. (i) P−1 and P1 are decreasing in v, whereas D is increasing in v. (ii) Pk is
increasing in Ik, whereas D is in general non-monotonic in I1.
Part (i) of Lemma 3 shows that as extreme voters become more partisan, their news sig-
nals become more biased and hence less effective in discerning good and bad performances,
and they are more likely to disagree with each other than before. Part (ii) of Lemma 3 shows
that as voters’ bandwidths increase, their news signals become more Blackwell informative
and so generate more incentive power individually, yet they may end up with more, not
less disagreements than before (see Figure 1 for a graphical illustration). The last situation
happens if extreme voters are eager to increase support for own-party candidates in face of
favorable data but are reluctant to cut back their support when data are unfavorable.
3.2 Accountability
We now take personalized news aggregators as given and verify whether accountability can
be sustained in an equilibrium or not. Straightforward algebra shows that this is the case
if and only if ξ ≥ cˆ, where ξ is the societal incentive power, defined as the difference in
the probabilities that the society re-elects the incumbent given good and bad performances,
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respectively, and cˆ is given by (2). As ξ increases, the society can better reward the incum-
bent for good performance and punish him for bad performance, which makes accountability
easier to sustain. The next theorem decomposes ξ into model primitives.
Theorem 1. Accountability is sustainable if and only if ξ ≥ cˆ, where
ξ =

P0 if f0 ≥ 1/2,
P1 +DP0 if f0 < 1/2.
We distinguish between two cases: (i) f0 ≥ 1/2 and (ii) f0 < 1/2. In the first case, a
majority of the voter population is concentrated at the center, which makes the centrist voter
the only pivotal voter. Accountability is sustainable if the centrist voter’s news aggregator
alone can motivate the high-ability incumbent to exert high effort.
In the second case, voters’ population distribution is sufficiently dispersed, which under
the assumption that signals are conditionally independent across voters implies that each
voter is pivotal with a positive probability. Consider two events. In the first event, extreme
voters receive the same voting recommendation, so the centrist voter is non-pivotal. The
societal incentive power stemming from this event simply equals the incentive power P1 (or
P−1 by symmetry) generated by extreme voters’ news aggregators. In the second event,
extreme voters receive conflicting voting recommendations, so the centrist voter is pivotal.
The societal incentive power stemming from this event equals its probability D times the
incentive power P0 generated by the centrist voter’s news aggregator.
We present three comparative statics results, which follow immediately from Lemma 3
and Theorem 1. The next proposition examines the effect of voters’ horizontal preferences
on societal incentive power.
Proposition 1. In the case where f0 < 1/2, ξ is in general non-monotonic in v.
As extreme voters become more partisan, their news aggregators become more biased
and, by Lemma 3, generate less incentive power individually. While this effect alone makes
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accountability harder to sustain, there is a countervailing effect stemming from the disagree-
ment between extreme voters, which arises more frequently as extreme voters become more
partisan. In case of disagreement, the centrist voter is pivotal and contributes to the soci-
etal incentive power. In one extreme situation where I0 ≈ 0, this contribution is negligible,
i.e., P0 ≈ 0, so ξ ≈ P1 and is decreasing in v by Lemma 3. In another extreme situation
where I0 ≈ 1, this contribution is close to its maximum, i.e., P0 ≈ 1, so ξ ≈ P1 + D and
is in general non-monotonic in v (see Figure 2 for a graphical illustration). For in-between
cases, the effect of v on societal incentive power is ambiguous.
The next proposition examines the effect of voters’ bandwidths on societal incentive
power.
Proposition 2. In the case where f0 < 1/2, ξ is increasing in I0 but in general non-
monotonic in I1.
As a voter’s bandwidth increases, his personalized news signal becomes more Blackwell
informative, which in the representative voter paradigm would make accountability easier
to sustain.9 However, there is an additional effect stemming from the disagreement between
extreme voters, which by Lemma 3 is non-monotonic in their bandwidths. Thus, while an
increase in the centrist voter’s bandwidth unambiguously raises the societal incentive power,
nothing as clear-cut can be said about extreme voters’ bandwidths.
The next proposition concerns the effect of voters’ population distribution on the societal
incentive power.
Proposition 3. Let ξ and ξ′ be the societal incentive power obtained under two population
distributions where f0 ≥ 1/2 > f ′0. Then ξ′ − ξ = P1 − (1−D)P0 is decreasing in I0 but is
in general non-monotonic in v and I1.
9This result is reminiscent of Proposition 5.2 of Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) (DJT), which
shows that in career-concern models, garbling the market signal undermines the agent’s incentives under
general conditions. In both DJT and the current paper, there is a one-to-one mapping between the agent’s
payoff (market wage in DJT, voting decision here) and the signal realization. In standard EAS models such
as Ashworth and de Mesquita (2014), such a mapping isn’t one-to-one (instead the voter adopts a threshold
voting rule), so increased signal informativeness could have ambiguous effects on the incumbent’s incentives.
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As we keep redistributing voters’ populations from the center to the margin, extreme
voters will eventually start contributing to the societal incentive power, after which the
centrist voter’s contribution will be discounted by the probability 1 − D that he is non-
pivotal. The resulting effect on societal incentive power is ambiguous and, by Lemma 3,
non-monotonic in extreme voters’ horizontal preferences and bandwidths; it is decreasing in
the centrist voter’s bandwidth for the same reason given in the explanation for Proposition
2.
3.3 Selection
The analysis so far carry seamlessly over to electoral selection, defined as the society’s ability
of retaining the high-ability incumbent and replacing the low-ability incumbent with the
challenger. Without accountability, voters pay no attention to the incumbent’s performance,
which makes selection impossible. With accountability, the expected quality of the second-
period officer equals
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
PΠks (R wins re-election | ω) · ω + PΠks (L wins election | ω) · 0 =
ξ
2
and so satisfies Propositions 1-3.10
3.4 Implications
EAS effects of mass polarization, voters’ bandwidths, and a recent technological
invention Recently, a growing body of the literature has been devoted to understanding
the causes and consequences of voter polarization (also termed mass polarization). Notably,
Fiorina and Abrams (2008) define mass polarization as a bimodal distribution of voters’
preferences on a liberal-conservative scale, and Gentzkow (2016) advocates using the aver-
age ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans to measure mass polarization.
Inspired by these authors, we define increasing mass polarization as a mean-preserving
10Thus effort and ability are complements in the sense of Ashworth, de Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2016).
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spread of voters’ horizontal preferences. Rather than to argue that mass polarization is on
the rise (existing evidence is mixed), we merely point out that increasing mass polarization
could have positive EAS consequences despite its negative connotation in everyday political
discourse. The subtlety stems from PNARI, which creates a role for extreme voters in up-
holding EAS in addition to the centrist voter. The plurality of voter opinions, together with
the own-party bias, paints a nuanced picture where changing voters’ horizontal preferences
and population distribution could have ambiguous effects on EAS (as shown in Propositions
1 and 3).
The level of political knowledge among ordinary citizens is viewed an important deter-
minant for how well elected officials are held accountable (see Ashworth (2012) and Prior
(2017) for literature surveys). Recently, political scholars and pundits have voiced growing
concerns over people’s shrinking attention spans, which result from the overabundance of
entertainment, the advent of the Internet and mobile devices, and the increased competi-
tion between firms for consumer eyeballs (Teixeira (2014); Dunaway (2016); Prior (2017)).
Propositions 2 and 3 together paint a more rosy picture: while a reduction in extreme vot-
ers’ bandwidth parameter I1 indeed makes their news signals less Blackwell informative, it
could positively affect their disagreement probability and, in turn, EAS.
In recent years, news aggregators such as Allsides.com have been built to battle the rising
polarization through providing users with unbiased viewpoints. Our analysis suggests that
this technological invention, while well-intentioned, could have unintended consequences
for EAS and voter welfare. Judging from its impact on EAS, feeding extreme voters with
unbiased viewpoints is mathematically equivalent to reducing their horizontal preference
parameter v, which by Proposition 1 could make accountability harder, not easier to sustain.
Even if we hold EAS fixed, extreme voters still prefer biased news to unbiased news by
Lemma 2, so a large-scale adoption of Allsides.com could reduce their expressive voting
utilities and, hence, welfare.
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A welfare-maximizing regulation An assumption we have so far maintained, namely
news signals are conditionally independent across voters, portrays news aggregation as a
decentralized and uncoordinated activity. In Appendix A, we relax this assumption and
instead consider all joint news distributions that are consistent with the marginal news
distributions we’ve so far solved. We find that in the case of f0 < 1/2, there always
exists a joint news distribution that attains the maximal societal incentive power ξ = 1,
meaning that despite the imperfection of individual voters’ news signals, the society as
a whole can perfectly reward good performance and punish bad performance, just as in
the benchmark situation where performance data can be observed by voters without errors.
This finding suggests that coordinating news aggregation among voters (e.g., through major
news aggregators), if done appropriately, could uphold accountability, optimize selection,
maximize expressive voting utilities and, together, attain the maximal voter welfare.
4 Concluding remarks
Recent technological advances give voters more flexibility to allocate limited attention
through algorithm-driven systems. While enhanced flexibility improves the utility gain
from paying attention, holding other things constant, it also affects EAS and, indirectly,
voter welfare. The current paper proposes a simple model to study the second channel. The
baseline model works with binary performance states and focuses on the surprising effects
stemming from voters’ disagreements. Appendix B investigates an extension to a contin-
uum of performance states. The finding there reinforces our message: when performance
states are rich, changes in model primitives can lead voters to re-adjust the focuses of their
attention in such a flexible way that even the impacts on the incentive power generated by
individual news aggregators could be ambiguous.
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A Joint news distribution
In this appendix, we relax the assumption that news signals are conditionally independent
across voters and, instead, consider all joint news distribution φ : Ω → ∆
(
{L,R}3
)
s that
are (i) symmetric, i.e.,
φ
(
(zk)k∈K | ω = 1
)
= φ
(
(z¬k )k∈K | ω = −1
) ∀ (zk)k∈K ∈ {L,R}3 (6)
where z¬k is defined by {zk, z¬k } = {L,R}, and (ii) consistent with the marginal news
distributions we’ve so far solved, i.e.,
∑
z−k∈{L,R}2
φ (zk, z−k | ω) = Πk (zk | ω) ∀k ∈ K, zk ∈ {L,R} and ω ∈ Ω. (7)
In the case where f0 < 1/2, the societal incentive power generated by such a φ is
ξφ =
∑
(zk)k∈K:
#{k:zk=R}≥2
φ
(
(zk)k∈K | ω = 1
)− ∑
(zk)k∈K:
#{k:zk=R}≥2
φ
(
(zk)k∈K | ω = −1
)
(8)
and satisfies ξφ ≤ 1 by definition. The next proposition shows that the inequality is binding
for some φ.
Proposition 4. There exists a φ that satisfies (6), (7), and ξφ = 1.
B Continuous state distribution
In this appendix, suppose Ω = [−1, 1], and the probability distribution Pa over Ω gen-
erated by each effort choice a ∈ {0, 1} has a p.d.f. pa that is positive almost every-
where. Let α denote the fraction of high-ability incumbents in the candidate pool, and
let P := αP1 + (1− α)P0 and p := αp1 + (1 − α)p0 be the probability distribution and
p.d.f. of the performance state in the case where aH = 1, respectively. As before, let
ω = E [θ | ω; aH = 1], which together with Bayes’ rule implies p0(ω)p1(ω) =
θH−ω
ω−θL .
20
There is a single voter with a horizontal preference parameter −v ∈ (−1, 0) and band-
width I > 0. A news aggregator is a finite signal structure Π : Ω → ∆ (Z). In the case
where aH = 1,
piz =
∫
ωΠ (z | ω) p (ω) dω
is the probability that the signal realization is z, and
µz =
∫
ωΠ (z | ω) p (ω) dω∫
Π (z | ω) p (ω) dω
is the posterior mean of the performance state conditional on the signal realization being z
(assume w.l.o.g. that piz > 0 for all z ∈ Z). The voter’s utility gain from using Π is given
by (3), and the amount of attention needed for absorbing the content delivered by Π is
I (Π) = H
(
P
)− EΠ [H (P (· | ω))]
where H is the entropy function. The voter’s problem is given by (4). In the case where
I < H
(
P
)
, any solution to this problem satisfies Lemma 1 by a straightforward extension
of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015). Given that solution, accountability is sustainable if and
only if
A :=
∫
m (ω) (p1 (ω)− p0 (ω)) dω ≥ c
where m (ω) := Π (R | ω).
In the baseline model with binary states, we demonstrated in Lemma 3 that A is de-
creasing in v and increasing in I. The next example shows that with a continuum of states,
A can be non-monotonic in v and I.
Example 1. Let θH = 1, θL = −1, α = 1/2, p1 (ω) = (1 + ω) /2 and p0 (ω) = (1− ω) /2,
so p (ω) = 1/2 and A =
∫
ωm (ω) dw. In the case where I = .1, solving A numerically for
v = .37, .38, and .39 yields .11, .09 and .10, respectively. To develop intuition for why A
could increase rather than decrease with v (i.e., the incentive power generated by the news
aggregator increases as the voter becomes more biased), note that when v = .39, the voter
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is pro-L and spends most of his attention on distinguishing whether ω is close to 1 or not.
The resulting m function is flat and takes a small value for most ωs but rises sharply as
ω approaches 1. As v decreases from .39 to .38, the voter becomes more moderate and
so spends his attention more evenly between distinguishing the various states. Also, his
average propensity to vote for candidate R increases, implying that the m function takes a
higher value on average but is flatter around ω ≈ 1 than in the previous case (see Figure 3
for a graphical illustration). Taking integration over ω, we obtain A =
∫
ωm (ω) dω. If the
complementarity between ω and m (ω) is sufficiently strong around ω ≈ 1 in the first case,
then A could and indeed increases as we raise v.
Next, we fix v = .1 and solve A numerically for I = .155, .16, and .165. The results
.243, .23, and .256 are non-monotone in I. To develop intuition for why A could decrease
rather than increase with I (i.e., the incentive power generated by the news aggregator
decreases as we increase the voter’s bandwidth), note that when I = .155, the voter, who
is pro-L, spends his limited bandwidth on distinguishing whether ω is close to one or not.
The resulting function is flat and takes a small value for most of ωs but rises sharply as ω
approaches 1. As we increase I from .155 to .16, the bandwidth constraint gets relaxed but
not by too much, so the voter re-adjusts his focus. In particular, he spends more attention
on distinguishing moderate ωs, meaning that the m function rises sharply over that region,
but is flatter and takes smaller values around ω ≈ 1 than in the previous case (see Figure 4
for a graphical illustration). If the complementarity between ω and m (ω) is strong in the
first case, then increases in I could and indeed reduces A. ♦
C Proofs
Throughout this appendix, write x for |µL| and y for µR to ease notation. For any signal
structure (x, y), rewrite (1), (3) and (5) as
I (x, y) =
y
x+ y
h (x) +
x
x+ y
h (y)
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Vk (x, y) =

x
x+y [vk + y]
+ if k ≤ 0
− yx+y [vk − x]− if k > 0
and
piL (x, y) =
y
x+ y
and piR (x, y) =
x
x+ y
,
respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1 We only prove the lemma for voter 1. The proofs for voters 0 and
−1 are analogous and therefore omitted from here. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. A personalized news aggregator for voter 1 solves
max
Z,Π:Ω→∆(Z),λ
V1 (Π) + λ (I1 − I (Π)) s.t. λ, I1 − I (Π) ≥ 0 and λ (I1 − I (Π)) = 0 (9)
where λ denotes a Lagrange multiplier associated with the voters’ bandwidth constraint.
It is easy to see that λ > 0, because if λ = 0, then the solution to (9) is to fully reveal ω
to the voter, who would then run out of bandwidth, a contradiction. This proves the claim
that the voter must exhaust his bandwidth.
Meanwhile, since the the performance state is binary, we can identify any finite signal
structure Π : Ω→ ∆ (Z) with the tuple (piz, µz)z∈Z , where piz denotes the probability that
the signal realization is z, and µz denotes the posterior mean of the state conditional on the
signal realization being z. The tuple must satisfy Bayes’ plausibility, which mandates that
the expected posterior mean of the state must equal the prior mean zero:
∑
z∈Z pizµz = 0.
Given this, consider a relaxed problem of (9):
max
Z,(piz ,µz)z∈Z
∑
z∈Z
piz
(− [v + µz]− − λh (µz)) s.t. ∑
z∈Z
pizµz = 0 (10)
where λ > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the bandwidth constraint. Note that
the maximand of (10) is posterior-separable. Also note that − [v + µ]−−λh (µ) is the maxi-
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mum of two strictly concave functions of µ: −λh (µ) and −v−µ−λh (µ), and because these
functions single-cross at µ = −v, their maximum is M-shaped. Using these observations
and applying the concavification method developed by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we
obtain a unique solution with at most two signal realizations. Indeed, since the voter must
exhaust his bandwidth, the solution must be nondegenerate and hence binary.
Step 2. Show that the Lagrange multiplier associated with the bandwidth constraint is
unique. Suppose the contrary is true. Let λ > λ′ > 0 be two distinct Lagrange multipliers,
and let (x, y) and (x′, y′) denote the unique solutions to (10) given λ and λ′, respectively.
From strict optimality, i.e., the voter strictly prefers (x, y) to (x′, y′) when the Lagrange
multiplier is λ, and strictly prefers (x′, y′) to (x, y) when the Lagrange multiplier is λ′, it
follows that
λ
(
I
(
x′, y′
)− I (x, y)) > V1 (x′, y′)− V1 (x, y) > λ′ (I (x′, y′)− I (x, y)) .
Simplifying using λ > λ′ yields I (x′, y′) > I (x, y), which contradicts the fact that I (x, y) =
I (x′, y′) = I1.
Combining Steps 1 and 2 shows that the solution to (9) is unique, binary and exhausts
the voter’s bandwidth. Given this, strict obedience requires no more proof than the verbal
argument offered in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 2 Again, we only prove the lemma for voter 1. We first show that Π1
is R-biased. Write (x, y) for Π1. Note first that (x, y) cannot be L-biased, because if the
contrary were true, i.e., y > x, then voter 1 would strictly prefer (y, x) to (x, y):
V1 (y, x) =
x
x+ y
(y − v) > y
x+ y
(x− v) = V1 (x, y) .
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It remains to show that (x, y) isn’t neutral, i.e., x 6= y. To this end, we simplify (10) to
max
x∈[v,1],y∈[0,1]
y
x+ y
(x− v)− λ
(
y
x+ y
h (x) +
x
x+ y
h (y)
)
. (11)
If the solution to (11) were neutral, i.e., x = y, then only three situations can happen:
(x, y) ∈ (v, 1)2, (x, y) = (1, 1), and (x, y) = (v, v). In the first situation, (x, y) must satisfy
the following first-order conditions:
y + v = λ
[
∆ + h′ (x) Σ
]
(12)
and x− v = λ [h′ (y) Σ−∆] (13)
where ∆ := h (y)−h (x) and Σ := x+y. Simplifying using x = y yields x+v = λh′ (x) ·2x =
x− v, which is impossible. Meanwhile, the second situation is impossible because the voter
would run out of bandwidth. In the third situation, we have V1 (v, v) = 0. But then the
voter would strictly prefer (1− , ) to (v, v) when  > 0 is sufficiently small, because the
former generates a strictly positive expressive voting utility:
V1 (1− , ) = 
1− +  (1− − v) > 0,
and it is moreover feasible:
I (1− , ) = 
1− + h (1− ) +
1− 
1− + h () < h (1) + h () < I1.
We next show that (x, y) becomes more R-biased as v increases. Fix any 0 < v < v′,
and let (x, y) and (x′, y′) denote the unique solutions to (9) when the voter’s horizontal
preference parameters are given by v and v′, respectively. From strictly optimality, i.e., the
voter strictly prefers (x, y) to (x′, y′) when his preference parameter is v, and strictly prefers
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(x′, y′) to (x, y) when his preference parameter is v′:
y
x+ y
(x− v) > y
′
x′ + y′
(
x′ − v) and y′
x′ + y′
(
x′ − v′) > y
x+ y
(
x− v′) ,
we deduce that
(
y′
x′ + y′
− y
x+ y
)
v >
x′y′
x′ + y′
− xy
x+ y
>
(
y′
x′ + y′
− y
x+ y
)
v′.
This, together with v′ > v, implies
y′
x′ + y′
<
y
x+ y
=⇒ x
′
y′
>
x
y
,
which proves that (x′, y′) is more R-biased than (x, y).
Proof of Theorem 1 By increasing his effort from low to high, candidate R changes his
winning probability by
∑
ω=±1
p1 (ω)PΠks {R wins re-election | ω} − p0 (ω)PΠks {R wins re-election | ω}
= (p1 (1)− p0 (1)) ξ
where ξ := PΠks {R wins re-election | ω = 1} − PΠks {R wins re-election | ω = −1} . Thus,
accountability is sustainable in an equilibrium if and only if
ξ ≥ c
p1 (1)− p0 (1)
:= cˆ.
To pin down ξ, we write a+k for Πk (R | ω = 1), a−k for Πk (R | ω = −1), and (xk, yk) for Πk
for each k ∈ K, where
a+−1 = 1− a−1 , a−−1 = 1− a+1 and a−0 = 1− a+0
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by symmetry. Straightforward algebra shows that
a+k =
xk (1 + yk)
xk + yk
and a−k =
xk (1− yk)
xk + yk
,
so
Pk := a
+
k − a−k =
2xkyk
xk + yk
∀k ∈ K
and
D :=
1
2
(
a+−1
(
1− a+1
)
+
(
1− a+−1
)
a+1
)
+
1
2
(
a−−1
(
1− a−1
)
+
(
1− a−−1
)
a−1
)
=
(
1− a−1
) (
1− a+1
)
+ a−1 a
+
1
= 1 + 2a−1 a
+
1 −
(
a−1 + a
+
1
)
= 1− 2x1y1 (1 + x1y1)
(x1 + y1)2
.
We distinguish between two cases: f0 ≥ 1/2 and f0 < 1/2. In the first case, candidate
R wins re-election if and only if voter 0’s signal recommends R, so
ξ = a+0 − a−0 := P0.
In the second case, candidate R wins re-election in two events: (i) voter ±1’s signals rec-
ommend R; (ii) voter −1 and 1 receive conflicting recommendations, and voter 0’s signal
recommends R. Event (i) contributes to ξ by
a+−1a
+
1 − a−−1a−1 =
(
1− a−1
)
a+1 −
(
1− a+1
)
a−1 = a
+
1 − a−1 := P1.
Event (ii) happens with probability D and so contributes to ξ by DP0. Taken together, we
obtain ξ = P1 +DP0, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3 Part (i): Recall that P1 and D are functions of (x1, y1), or simply
(x, y). For each function g ∈ {I, P1, D} of (x, y), write gx for ∂g (x, y) /∂x and gy for
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∂g (x, y) /∂y. Straightforward algebra shows that
Ix =
y
(x+ y)2
[
h (y)− h (x) + h′ (x) (x+ y)] , Iy = x
(x+ y)2
[
h (x)− h (y) + h′ (y) (x+ y)] ,
P1,x =
2y2
(x+ y)2
, P1,y =
2x2
(x+ y)2
,
Dx = −
2y
(
2xy2 − x+ y)
(x+ y)3
, and Dy = −
2x
(
2x2y − y + x)
(x+ y)3
.
We first show that P1 (x, y) decreases as we traverse along voter 1’s attention level curve
from its intersection with the 45 degree line to its most R-biased element. This portion of
the attention level curve can be expressed as
{
(x, y) : I (x, y) = I1, x ∈
[
h−1 (I1) , 1
]}
, where
x > y if and only if x > h−1 (I1). Write C (I1) for
{
(x, y) : I (x, y) = I1, x > h
−1 (I1)
}
. As
we increase x by an arbitrarily small amount  > 0, we must change y by approximately
(−Ix/Iy) ·  in order to stay on C (I1), and the resulting change in P1 equals approximately
(P1,x − P1,yIx/Iy) · . Since P1,y > 0, it suffices to show that for all (x, y) ∈ C (I1), it holds
that −Ix/Iy < −P1,x/P1,y, or equivalently
h (y)− h (x) + h′ (x) (x+ y)
h (x)− h (y) + h′ (y) (x+ y) >
y
x
. (14)
Since the function h is strictly convex and strictly increasing on [0, 1], it follows that
h (y)− h (x) + h′ (x) (x+ y) > h′ (x) (y − x) + h′ (x) (x+ y) = 2h′ (x) y
and h (x)− h (y) + h′ (y) (x+ y) < h′ (x) (x− y) + h′ (x) (x+ y) = 2h′ (x)x,
which together implies (14).
We next show that D (x, y) increases as we traverse along C (I1) as above. For any
(x, y) ∈ C (I1), we have x > y and so Dy = −2x
(
2x2y − y + x) / (x+ y)3 < 0. Thus if
Dx ≥ 0, then Dx −DyIx/Iy > 0, so we are done. If Dx < 0, then it suffices to show that
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for all (x, y) ∈ C (I1), it holds that −Ix/Iy < −Dx/Dy, or equivalently
h (y)− h (x) + h′ (x) (x+ y)
h (x)− h (y) + h′ (y) (x+ y) >
2xy2 − x+ y
2x2y − y + x.
Since x > y, the right-hand side of the above inequality is bounded above by
2xy2 − x+ y
2x2y − y + x <
2xy2
2x2y
=
y
x
,
which together with (14) gives the desired result.
Part (ii): We only prove that P1 is increasing in I1. Since P1 = 2x1y1/ (x1 + y1) is increasing
in x1 and y1 (the posterior means induced by voter 1’s signal), it suffices to show that x1
and y1, or simply x and y, are both increasing in I1.
Step 1. Problem (11) solves voter 1’s news aggregation by treating the Lagrange multiplier
λ > 0 associated with his bandwidth constraint as an exogenous parameter. If the solution
to (11) takes interior value in [v, 1] × [0, 1], then it must satisfy the first-order conditions
(12) and (13). Summing up (12) and (13) yields
h′ (x) + h′ (y) = 1/λ, (15)
and using (15) when differentiating (13) with respect to λ yields
−dx
dλ
=∆− h′ (y) Σ + λ
[
h′ (y)
dy
dλ
− h′ (x) dx
dλ
− h′′ (y) dy
dλ
Σ− h′ (y) dy
dλ
− h′ (y) dx
dλ
]
=∆− h′ (y) Σ− λh′′ (y) dy
dλ
Σ− dx
dλ
where ∆ := h (y)− h (x) and Σ := x+ y. Therefore,
dy
dλ
=
∆− h′ (y) Σ
λh′′ (y) Σ
=
h (y)− h (x)− h′ (y) (x+ y)
λh′′ (y) (x+ y)
< 0, (16)
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where the inequality uses the facts that h′′ > 0, h′ > 0 on (0, 1), h (y)−h (x)−h′ (y) (x+ y) <
0 if 0 ≤ y < x, and h (y) − h (x) − h′ (y) (x+ y) ≤ h′ (y) (y − x) − h′ (y) (x+ y) < 0 if
y ≥ x ≥ v. Meanwhile, differentiating (15) with respect to λ yields
−h′′ (x) dx
dλ
= h′′ (y)
dy
dλ
+
1
λ2
,
and simplifying using (16) yields
dx
dλ
= −∆ + h
′ (x) Σ
λh′′ (x) Σ
= −h (y)− h (x) + h
′ (x) (x+ y)
λh′′ (x) (x+ y)
< 0, (17)
where the inequality uses the facts that h′′ > 0, h′ > 0 on (0, 1), h (y)−h (x)+h′ (x) (x+y) >
0 if y ≥ x ≥ v, and h (y) − h (x) + h′ (x) (x + y) > −h′(x)(x − y) + h′ (x) (x + y) > 0 if
0 ≤ y < x. Together, (16) and (17) imply that x and y strictly increase as λ slightly
decreases. As λ further decreases, the solution to (11) may transition from an interior one
to a corner one. When that happens, we must have x = 1, because (x, y) is R-biased by
Lemma 2. As λ continues to decrease, x stays at 1, whereas y increases.
Step 2. Take any I, I ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that I < I ′. Let λ and λ′ denote the Lagrange
multipliers associated with voter 1’s bandwidth constraint when the bandwidths are given
by I and I ′, respectively, and let (x, y) and (x′, y′) denote the solutions to (11) when the
Lagrange multipliers are given by λ and λ′, respectively. From strict optimality, i.e., voter 1
strictly prefers (x, y) to (x′, y′) when the Lagrange multiplier is λ, and strictly prefer (x′, y′)
to (x, y) when the Lagrange multiplier is λ′, we deduce that
λ
[
I
(
x′, y′
)− I (x, y)] > V1 (x′, y′)− V1 (x, y) > λ′ [I (x′, y′)− I (x, y)] .
Simplifying using I < I ′ yields λ′ < λ, so x′ ≥ x, y′ ≥ y, and one of the inequalities is
strict.
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Proof of Proposition 4 Any symmetric joint signal distribution φ can be represented
the following table:
φ LLL RLL LRL LLR RRL LRR RLR RRR
ω = 1 x8 x7 x6 x5 x4 x3 x2 x1
ω = −1 x1 x4 x2 x3 x7 x5 x6 x8
where xi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, · · · , 8, and
∑8
i=1 xi = 1. Given this, we can express the societal
incentive power ξφ generated by φ (defined as in (8)) as
(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4)− (x5 + x6 + x7 + x8) = 2 (x1 + x2 + x3 + x4)− 1. (18)
We can also reduce the consistency constraint (7) to
pi1,R =
1
2
(x3 − x4 + x5 − x7 + 1) (19)
pi0,R =
1
2
8∑
i=1
xi =
1
2
(20)
and
pi−1,R =
1
2
(−x3 + x4 − x5 + x7 + 1) , (21)
where pik,z denotes the marginal probability that voter k’s signal recommends z ∈ {L,R}.
Note that (20) is automatically satisfied, and (19) implies (21) because pi−1,R = pi1,L =
1− pi1,R. Solving
max
{xi}8i=1
(18) s.t. xi ≥ 0,
8∑
i=1
xi = 1 and (19)
using Mathematica yields x5 = x6 = x7 = x8 = 0, x1 + x2 ≤ 2 (1− pi1,R), x3 = pi1,R− (x1 +
x2)/2 and x4 = 1 − pi1,R − (x1 + x2)/2, and plugging this solution back into (18) yields
ξφ = 1.
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Figure 1: Plot D against I1: h (µ) = µ
6, v = .1, f0 < 1/2.
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Figure 2: Plot ξ against v: h (µ) = µ6, I1 = .1, f0 < 1/2.
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Figure 3: Plot m (ω) against ω: model parameters as specified in the text.
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